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Abstract
Recent research in risk perception has examined the role of affect and worldviews as orienting
dispositions that guide people's decisions about complex and risky topics such as nuclear energy.
This study tests and supports the hypothesis that worldviews and affect-laden imagery are highly
predictive of perceptions of risk from nuclear power and support for that technology.
Furthermore, affect and worldviews each contribute independently to the prediction of nuclear
support. We find also that a person's affective imagery associated with nuclear power is
systematically related to their worldviews. We conclude that affect and worldviews appear to
play similar roles as orienting mechanisms, helping people navigate in a complex, uncertain, and
sometimes dangerous world. The implication of this view for the practice of risk communication
is briefly discussed.
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Affect and Worldviews
The Role of Affect and Worldviews as Orienting Dispositions in
the Perception and Acceptance of Nuclear Power
The present study examines the interaction between two psychological systems—cognition
and affect—and their joint influence on perception and acceptance of risks, with particular
emphasis on the risks from nuclear power.
Risk Perception and Cognition ^_
People respond to hazards according to their perceptions of the risks they pose. What they
perceive, why theyperceive it thatway, andhowtheywill subsequently behave is a matter of
great import to industries and governments trying to assess and implement new technologies.
Risk perception studies have focused extensivelyon the cognitive forces that influence risk
attitudes and behaviors. For example, Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein (1979) suggested that
people use various heuristic strategies to reduce the difficult mental task of understanding and
responding to risks to simpler tasks that require less effort and cognitive capacity.
Research following a psychometricparadigmhas led to a taxonomy for hazards useful for
understandingand predicting responsesto risks (Slovic, 1987). Specifically, this work suggests
that people's risk perceptions canbe characterized along two dimensions—dread risk as defined
by the extent ofperceived lack ofcontrol, feelings ofdread,1 perceived catastrophic potential,
and the inequitable distribution of risks and benefits andunknown riskor the extent to which a
hazard is judged to be unobservable, unknown, new, and delayed in producing harmful impacts.
These simplified "cognitive maps" appear to be quite robust when international groups of
laypeople aswell asexperts judge diverse hazards (Englander, Farago, Slovic, & Fischhoff,
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1986; Kleinhesselink & Rosa, 1991; Mullet, Duquesnoy, Raiff, Fahrasmane, & Namur, 1993;
Namur & Sornay, 1988; Slovic, 1987; Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1980,1984; Teigen,
Bran, & Slovic, 1988). They appear useful in explaining and also forecasting public reaction to
specific technologies. For example, hazards such as nuclear power andDNA technology tendto
bejudged high on boththe dread risk and unknown risk factors. An accident in eitherof these
domains will likely produce a high degree of concern as well as social impacts that extend far
beyond the original cost of lives lost or equipment damaged (e.g., economic losses for the
company andeven for the entire industry, new government regulations, and a host of other social
impacts).
Risk Perception and Affect
Thewaythat a person thinks about a hazard andorganizes information about it is obviously
important forunderstanding risk perception. Studies suggest thathow theperson feels about a
hazard or its risk (i.e., his/her affective reaction) also influences riskperception. Slovic, Flynn,
andLayman (1991) attempted to go beyond cognitive maps to discover what may drive
perceptions andtheirensuing social impacts. They found thataffect associated with images of a
stimulus wasrelated to judgments andpreferences. Using the method of continued associations
(Szalay & Deese, 1978), verbal imagery was elicited from participants in four surveys.
Participants were asked to free associate to the concept ofa nuclear waste repository to evoke
their images and thoughts related to that concept. After free-associating to the repository
stimulus, each respondent rated the affective quality ofthese associations ona five-point scale,
ranging from extremely negative to extremely positive. These affective ratings were found tobe
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related to whether the person would vote for or against a referendum on a nuclear waste
repository, and to their judgments regarding the likelihood of a repository accident. For example,
in one study more than 90% of those people whose first image was judged very negative said that
they would vote against a repository at Yucca Mountain; fewer than 50% ofthose people whose
first image was positive said they would vote against the repository (Slovic, Flynn, & Layman,
1991). In another study, Slovic, Layman, Kraus, Flynn, Chalmers, and Gesell (1991) foundjthat
affective ratings of imagery associated with four citiesand four states were highly predictive of
vacation preferences as well as job and retirementpreferences for those places.
The relationship betweenaffect and risk perception was also studiedby Alhakami and Slovic
(1994). They observed that, whereas risksand benefits tend to be positively associated in the
world(high-risk activities tend to provide greater benefits and vice-versa), they are inversely
correlated in people's minds (higherperceived benefit is associated with lowerperceived risk;
lower perceived benefit is associated withhigher perceived risk). Alhakami and Slovic found that
this inverse relationshipwas linkedto people's reliance on general affective evaluations when
making risk/benefit judgments. When the affective evaluation was favorable, the activity being
judgedwas seenas having highbenefit and lowrisk; when the evaluation wasunfavorable, risks
tended to be seen as high and benefits as low.
Another demonstration of the influence of affect on risk perception comes from a study by
Johnsonand Tversky (1983). Theypresented student respondents with three brief, newspaper-
style stories about a tragedy involving the death ofanundergraduate student. Each story depicted
a different cause of death: homicide, leukemia or fire. After reading the stories, respondents
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estimated the frequencies of fatalities from 17 different causes, including diseases (e.g.,
leukemia, lung cancer, heart disease), hazards (e.g., fire, electrocution), and violence (e.g.,
homicide, terrorism). The results showed that reading about a tragic event increased frequency
estimates across all causes of death. Johnson and Tversky interpreted this as an indication that
the negative affect generated by the tragic story influenced all the subsequent estimates,
regardless of the similarity between a tragic event and the other events.
Risk Perception and Worldviews
. According to Dake (1991, 1992), worldviews, defined as generalized attitudes toward the
world and its social organization, are "orienting.dispositions," serving to guide people's
responses in complex situations. As such, they have been found, by Dake and others, to be
instrumental in determining a person's risk attitudes and perceptions. Dake argues that people's
identities and worldviews are mediated by their social relations to groups as well as by the extent
of social prescriptions that constrain their behavior. A person can be either more group-oriented
or more individual-oriented (e.g., in terms of beliefs about right and wrong, beliefs about where
control emanates, and beliefs about responsibilities to others). In addition, the person may
believe either that many rules are needed to control behavior and that these rules should be
different across society, or that few socially stratified rules are necessary. In a 2 x 2 matrix of
social relations by level of prescription, four basic worldviews emerge: hierarchical, fatalistic,
individualistic, and egalitarian. Thosewhofollowthe hierarchical worldview are said to be
group-oriented and to believe in a high level of stratified prescriptions. TheFatalist also believes
in high levels of stratified prescription, but is more isolated andtends to focus on individuals
Affect and Worldviews 7
rather than groups. The Individualist is hypothesized to be more individual-oriented and to
believe that few rules are necessary to govern behavior. The Egalitarian is more group-oriented,
but also believes in low levels of stratified rales. A fifth cultural view, hermit, is hypothesized as
being largely asocial and was not considered in the present study.
In general, Dake's (1991) hypotheses and results suggest a systematic relation between
worldviews and risk perceptions including perceptions and acceptance of risk from nuclear^_
power. Fatalists, for example, who are individual-oriented as well as supportive of stratified
rules, are hypothesized not to trust experts, but to condone their power and the technologies they
support. Individualists, on the other hand, perceive themselves to be involved in bidding and
bargaining with others to attain their personal goals and desires. They presumably would be
supportive of nuclear power as a meansto attain further wealth and to maintain a free market
mechanism, but they would not support nuclear power if they viewed it as intruding on personal
freedoms. Egalitarians are hypothesizedto oppose nuclear energy because they perceive it as
creating further stratifications of wealth and power, an outcome that Hierarchists should be quite
comfortable with. More will be said about these worldviews in a later section when Dake's
hypotheses are compared and contrastedto results from the present study.
Jenkins-Smith (1993) suggested that an individual's worldview acts as a cognitive filter to
screen the information from which verbal images are constructed. He proposes a model in which
worldviews influence the content of the images that the individual has of a place. In supporting
studies,he showedthat Hierarchists were three times less likely than Egalitarians and
Individualists to provide a nuclear image in response to the stimulus, "Nevada."
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A hypothesized relation between affect and worldview also is supported in Jenkins-Smith's
studies. Egalitarians gave images to the stimulus, nuclear waste repository, that were
significantly more negative than images given by either Hierarchists or Individualists. Jenkins-
Smith concludes that, rather than being passive receivers of information, "people actively impute
significance and value to signals in systematic ways" (p. 2). Worldviews then may be one system
for assessing value. _^
In short, images about a place and the emotional significance attachedto them are related to
an individual's worldview. Certain kinds of people are more likely to acquire negative images
and/or nuclear images of a place than others. The affect attached to the images then is a strong
predictor of decisions regarding that.place. The influence of bothaffect and worldview couldbe
quite important as local and national governments straggle to sitenuclear waste repositories,
chemical plants, and other facilities perceived to be high in risk.
. The Jenkins-Smith model, however, in giving precedence to the role of worldviews as
cognitive filters of risk information plays downthe potentially strong, independent impact of
affect specific to images of nuclearenergy. The strongaffectassociated with nuclearenergywas
noted by Smith (1.988), who observed, "nuclear energy wasconceived in secrecy, born in war,
and first revealed to the world in horror. No matter how much proponents try to separate the
peaceful from the weapons atom, the connection is firmly embedded in the minds ofthe public"
(p. 1606).
Inthe present study, wehave examined therole ofworldview and affect as orienting
dispositions inthe perception and acceptance ofnuclear power. Our primary hypotheses were:
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1. Worldviews and affect will each provide significant, independent contributions to the
prediction of nuclear support. They will orient perceptions ofnuclear power and the
resulting support or opposition of nuclear power.
2. Affect will be more highly predictive of nuclear support than worldviews. Affect, as
studied here, is related to images associated strongly with nuclear power, whereas
worldviews are more generalized attitudes toward political, social, and economic
relations, with a less explicit relation to the domain of nuclear power.
3. Worldviews and affect will be systematically related to one another as suggested by past
research. For example, Egalitarians will tend to have more negative affect for images
associated with nuclear power as they interpret incoming information through their a
priori beliefs about political, economic, and social relations while Hierarchists and
Fatalists will tend to have more positive images of nuclear energy.
Method
A national telephone survey was conducted to test hypotheses about the factors relating to
perception and acceptance of nuclear power. A representative sample of the adult population in
the United States was surveyed by telephone during the period November 21, 1992, to January
16, 1993. Respondents were chosen based on a random digit dialing method combined with
recruiting the person in the household who was over 18 years old and had the most recent
birthdate. A total of 1512.English-speaking respondents answered 155 questions, with an average
interview length of approximately 30 minutes. The response rate was 50.7%.
: The characteristics of the present sample can be compared roughly to the data from the U.S.
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Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of Population, which assessed 93 million households. The
composition of the sample was 51.8% female compared to 52.1% in the 1990 U.S. Census. The
age range of the sample was 18 to 90, with a mean age of42.2 years. The age data are as follows
for this sample and the U.S. Census, respectively: age 18 to 29 (23.2% vs. 26.0%), age 30 to 54
(54.4% vs. 45.7%o), and over age 55 (22.4% vs. 28.3%). White respondents made up 84.3% of
the total sample (vs. 86.0%) in the Census), blacks were 7.5% ofthe present sample (vs. 11.3% in
the Census), and other nonwhites comprised 6.7% of the sample (vs. 2.8% in the Census).
Hispanics (who can be of any race) were 3.8% of the sample (vs. 6.3% in the Census).
Affect
The survey's first question elicited images to the stimulus "nuclear power" using a version of
the method of continued associations (Szalay & Deese, 1978) adapted for use in a telephone
survey (see, e.g., Slovic, Flynn, & Layman, 1991; Slovic, Layman et'al., 1991). The elicitation
interview proceeded as follows:
The first question involves word associations. Think about "nuclear power" for a
moment. When you hear the words "nuclear power" what is the first word or image that
comes to mind?
What is the next word or image that comes to mind when you think of"nuclear power"?
A final word or image associated with "nuclear power"?
Up to three images were elicitedfrom eachrespondent. Next, respondents were asked to rate
each imagethey gave on a scaleranging from verynegative (1), negative (2), neutral (3), positive
(4), to very positive (5). The imageratings wereaveraged for each respondent, and this number
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was used as the measure of average affect in the rest of this article.
Worldviews
A set of 15 questions (see Table 1) was selected in part from scales used by Dake (1991,
1992) to measure the extent to which an individual held the four worldviews hypothesized to be
related to nuclear support (e.g., Hierarchical, Fatalistic, Individualistic, and Egalitarian). Care
was taken to ensure that the content of the worldview items did not overlap with the contentof
the items (e.g., nuclear support) to be predicted as dependent variables in the analysis.
Insert Table 1 about here
Nuclear Power
We derived an index ofnuclear support by selecting five items (see Table 2), such as "Ifyour
community was faced with a potential shortage of electricity, do you.. .agree.. .that a new nuclear
power plant shouldbe built to supply that electricity?" and computing an averageacross those
five items for each respondent.
Insert Table 2 about here
The survey also included a variety ofother questions about perceived risks, attitudes toward
health and the environment, trast in experts, government and science,personality characteristics,
and demographic variables.
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. Results
Our analysis first examines the affective ratings given to associations to the stimulus, nuclear
power. Next, results from the worldview questions are presented. Finally, models are constracted
to predict support for nuclear power based on affect and worldviews.
Affect
In this survey, 3537 images of nuclear power and their corresponding affective ratings were
elicited. Each participant provided between zero and three images with ratings, for an average of
2.3 images per respondent! We expected the imagery to the stimulus, nuclear power, to be quite
negative as it was to the stimulus phrases "underground nuclear waste storage facility" and
"nuclear waste repository" in earlier studies (Slovic, Flynn, & Layman, 1991; Slovic, Layman et
al., 1991). The present results, however, supported Jenkins-Smith's (1993) conclusion that
imagery to nuclear things (i.e., "a high level nuclear waste repository" and "a nuclear power
plant") was not consistently negative. The affective ratings of the 3537 images in the present
study were distributed across the scale from very negative to very positive, with 47% ofthe
images rated either positive or very positive, 12% rated neutral, and 41% rated negative or very
negative.2 Inaddition, some individuals had a view ofnuclear power that included both positive
and negative elements. For example, of those respondents who provided a first image that was
evaluated as very negative, 43% of them gave a second rating that also was very negative, but
21% of them gave images that they evaluated as positive or very positive (14%'did not provide a
second image, and 22% provided images that were either negative, as opposed to very negative,
or neutral).
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Worldviews
Correlations between pairs of worldview items ranged between r = —. 19 and .31. A principle
components analysis using both orthogonal (i.e., varimax and equamax) and oblique (i.e.,
promax) rotations was conducted on these intercorrelations. Similar solutions were obtained with
each of these rotations. Therefore, only results from the principal components analysis with
varimax rotation will be reported here. The number of factors retained was guided by the
proportion ofvariance explained by a factor and its theoretical interpretability. Items with
loadings of .40 or higher were considered to load on a factor and contribute to its interpretation.
The analysis produced three worldview factors, accounting for 37% of the variance in the
items. The first factor emerged as a blend of the Fatalistic and Hierarchical worldviews. The
other two factors corresponded well with Dake's (1991, 1992) Individualist and Egalitarian
views. Table 1 shows the rotated factor structure.
Cultural theory suggests that worldviews help people interpret the world in such a way as to
maintain their system of beliefs and moral codes. Dake suggests that Hierarchists and Fatalists
both support systems that allow for the social stratification of rules although Hierarchists tend to
be more group-oriented and Fatalists tend to be more individual-oriented. According to cultural
theory, Hierarchists find social deviance particularly abhorrent. They believe that commands
should flow down the power structure and complianceshould flow up. Factor 1 included high
loadingson items calling for support for a hierarchical structure (e.g., "We have gone too far in
pushing equal rights in this country" and "Decisions abouthealthrisks should be left to the
experts"). This factor, however, also has significant loadings on itemsthat seemto represent the
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Fatalistic worldview. Cultural theory predicts a group that rationalizes isolation and is resigned
to stringent controls on their behavior (Mars, 1982). The possible explanations range from
Fatalists, being unable to compete successfully, meet minimum social standards, or muster the
time, energy, or resources to have a voice in politics (Dake, 1992) to Fatalists simply wanting to
be free from the disempowerment of well wishers' influences (Dake, 1992). This complex factor
which included items related to the Hierarchical worldview also included items that reflected
cultural theory's "Why bother?" rationalization (e.g., "It's no use worrying about public affairs; I
can't do anything about them anyway").
This first factor appears to be a complex blend of attitudes. It includes a belief in hierarchy,
but also a resignation to stringent controls rather than faith and trast in those doing the
controlling. Personal rights seem less important to those who score high on this factor (e.g., "The
police should have the right to listen to private phone calls to investigate a crime"). It is not
merely that persons scoring high on this factor do not have the energy to fight for personal rights
as Dake suggests for the Fatalistic worldview. Instead, the level of personal rights they condone,
and perhaps desire, apparently has been surpassed already (e.g., "We have gone too far in
pushing equal rights in this country"). Note that this data also allows for the interpretation that
those who score high on this factor already have these rights for themselves, but that they do not
want it extended to others. This possibility is, however, contrary to Dake's hypothesis of
resignationto stringentcontrols on the Fatalists' own behavior. It also seemsless likely when
demographic information is considered. Correlations between factor scores for the
Fatalist/Hierarch factor and demographic variables of age, education, income, and race suggest
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that persons scoring high on this factor tend to be older, less educated, and have lower incomes
than persons scoring low on this factor (r - .11, -.28, -.17, respectively, p_ < .0001). This factor
score did not correlate significantly with race (r = .02, p < .54). These trends do not suggest a
group of people who would perceive themselves empowered by having more rights than others.
The Individualist, as hypothesized in cultural theory, is said to support self-regulation of the
individual as well as of markets. Unlike Hierarchists, Individualists are said to have concerns
about social deviance only if it disrupts the stability of market relationships or limits freedom.
Ourdatashowpersons who score high(vs. low) onthe Individualist factor tendto be in favor of
capital punishment (perhaps the Individualist believes that a crime deserving capital punishment
would lessen "his/her freedom to bid and bargain in self-regulated networks") (Dake, 1992, p.
29). Other loadings in this second factor clearly indicate the importance of personal freedom to
persons high on the Individualist factor (e.g., "In a fair system, people with more ability should
earn more" and "Government has no right to regulate people's personal risk-taking activities").
Persons high on this factor tend to watch over their personal interests as suggested by the high
loading on an item concerning trust in authority (i.e., "People in positions of authority tend to
abuse their power").
The third factor corresponds well with the Egalitarian worldview. Egalitarians are
hypothesized to advocate a moreparticipatory approach to risk, politics, the economy, and the
environment. This factor loaded highly with items calling for more equality of resources (e.g., "If
people in this country were treated equally, wewould have fewer problems" arid "What this
world needs is a more equal distribution of wealth"). This factor also supports Dake's (1992)
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hypothesis that the Egalitarian views authority with distrust (i.e., "People in positions of
authority tend to abuse their power").
The factor loadings in the present study are consistent with previous hypotheses and findings.
They are also stable across multiple rotations. Factor scale reliabilities were computed using
coefficient alpha for standardized variables (Cronbach, 1951) and these were, in order of the
factors: .60, .42, and .50. One item loaded over .40 on two factors, and all items reached the_ __
criterion loading for a factor (one item loaded .39 and was included). All three factors were
retained in further analyses.
Characterization of Worldviews
To discover the relationships between these worldview factors and variables from other
domains, correlations were computed between the three factors and questions relating to nuclear
support, high technology and environmental concerns, perceived health risks, desire for control,
political orientation, personality, and demographic variables (see tables 2-6). The items in each
grouping are presented in an order that corresponds to their correlations with the Egalitarian
factor.5
Nuclear support. The data support Dake's (1991, 1992) hypotheses that the Fatalistic and
Hierarchical views are strongly associated with less concern about technological dangers. More
specifically, the correlations in Table 2 indicate that persons who scored higher on this
Fatalist/Hierarch factor were more likely to be supportive of nuclear energy (e.g., "In order to
avoid importing energy from other countries to meet our future electricity needs, America should
rely more heavily on nuclear power").
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The Individualist also tends to be pro-nuclear energy. The Individualist factor scores showed
significant correlations with all but one of the nuclear support items. These results are consistent
with the hypothesized views (Dake, 1991) of the Individualist (i.e., the Individualist would
support nuclear power if it was perceived to increase economic good through unfettered market
mechanisms). The Egalitarian view, as hypothesized, correlates significantly with a lack of
support fornuclear power, in contrast to the other worldviews. A person scoring high onthis_
factor is most likely to disagree with the pro-nuclear statements in Table 2.
Technology and environmental concerns. We calculated correlations between the three
worldview factor scores and items concerning technology and the environment (see Table 3). As
predicted (Dake, 1991), this data confirms the hypothesis that the Egalitarian factor will be
strongly related to concerns about technology and the environment while persons high on the
Fatalist/Hierarch and the Individualist factors will show far less concern about these same issues.
The Egalitarian factor correlates negatively with trust in government decisions (e.g., "Our
government and industry can be trusted with making proper decisions to manage the risks from
technology") while the Fatalist/Hierarch factor correlates strongly in a positive direction with this
same item. The Individualist factor score, while it does not correlate significantly with trast in
government decisions (the Individualist is hypothesized to believe in self-regulation and few
stratified rules), does have strong positive correlations with items concerning support for high
technology in general and government energy choices in particular (e.g., "A high technology
society is important for improving our health and social well being" and "We need to pull
together and support the energy choices our government has made").
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Insert Table 3 about here
The Egalitarian factor scores correlated highly in a positive direction with environmental
concerns (e.g., "Technological development is destroying nature"). We would have expected the
Individualist factor score to correlate negatively with these same items because Individualists are
presumed to believe that nature is robust and that free market mechanismswill allow plenty for
all. However, perhaps some Individualists, who tend not to trust government decisions, believe
that the current practices around technological development are destroyingnature, so that the
Individualist factor scores do not correlate in any significant way with items regarding
environment concern.
Perception ofhealth risks. In addition to being more concernedabout technology in general
and nuclearpower in particular, Egalitarians are hypothesized to be more critical of society and
more concerned about risk across a wide variety of issues: This hypothesis is supported (see
Table 4) as the Egalitarian factor scores correlate strongly in a positive direction with almost all
the perceived risk items. The correlations wereparticularly high for perceived risks from nuclear
powerplantsand nuclearwaste. Persons who scored higheron the Egalitarian factorweremore
likely to have higher perceptions of health risks to the American public from thesevarious
hazards. The Egalitarian's hypothesized view of the world as fragile is supported as it was in
Dake's (1991) empirical study. Persons high ontheFatalist/Hierarch or Individualist factors, on
the otherhand, tended, to perceive slightly lower health risks to the American public as a whole
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with more negative than positive correlations with the various risk items. Interestingly, there are
only four significant positive correlations betweenthe Fatalist/Hierarch factor score and
perceivedhealth risks, all of which are relatively knownrisks (i.e., medical X-rays, commercial
air travel, storms and floods, and blood transfusions). While the Egalitarian factor scores also
correlate significantly with two of these risks (i.e., medical X-rays and commercial air travel), the
Individualist factor scores do notcorrelate significantly with any of these risks. In addition,^
unlike the other worldviews, persons scoring high on the Fatalist/Hierarch complex tended to
answernegatively (r = .12, p < .0001) to a question regarding personal risk-taking (i.e., "Do you
voluntarily participate in any activity that others consider a risk to yourhealthor safety?" ,
scored as yes (l)/no (2)). These results suggest thatpersons highon the Fatalist/Hierarch factor
mayhave a different cognitive stracturing of risks compared to other groups. Theresults are also
consistent with earlierfindings (Dake, 1991) that those whofeel our society shouldtake risks
with technology tend themselves to be cautious and to seek stability, not change.
Insert Table 4 about here
Desire forpublic control. Worldviews also correlate with items pertaining to desire for
control (see Table 5). While the item concerning feelings of little control over personal health
risks loaded highly onboth the Fatalist/Hierarch and Egalitarian factors (loadings of .43, and .36,
respectively; see Table \\ persons high on these factors do not share the same desire for
increased control with regard to nuclear power. Egalitarian factor scores hadthe highest
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correlations with each question about desire for control over the management of nuclear power
plants. The Egalitarian worldview is hypothesized to favor more equality in terms of wealth,
race, gender, authority, etc. This hypothesis is supported by the finding that persons scoringhigh
(vs. low) on the Egalitarian factor endorse items such as "People living near a nuclear power
plant should have the authority to close the plant if they think it is not being run properly."
Insert Table. 5 about here
Persons scoring high (vs. low) on the Fatalist/Hierarch factor are more willing to give up
control. This may be due to the belief in complianceto authority and experts (e.g., Hierarchists),
or it may be due to a wish not to have control in the case ofnuclear power and to be willing to
give control to the experts about a variety of issues (again, the "why bother?" mentality of
Fatalists). An alternate explanation is that persons high on the Fatalist/Hierarch factor simplydo
not perceive nuclearpower plants as a threat to their personal health. They tended to rate the
health risks ofnuclear power lower than persons high on the Egalitarian factor. (The percentage
of persons in the upperquartile of eachworldview group ratingnuclear poweras a high health
risk was as follows: Fatalist/Hierarch, 35.1%, Individualist, 28.7%, Egalitarian, 45.8%).
Whatever the reason, persons high (vs. low) on the Fatalist/Hierarch factorwere less likely to
desire more control over nuclear issues compared to personshigh (vs. low) on the Egalitarian
factor, who were more likely to desire more control.
We expected persons high ontheIndividualist factor to desire more control in general
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because they are hypothesized to support self-regulation in its various forms. The data did not
support this hypothesis. Individualist factor scores correlated positively with two items
concerning desire for public and local control, but also correlated positively with an item that
suggests a belief that there is enough control already (i.e., "The process of licensing nuclear
power plants provides adequate opportunity for the public to have their concerns considered").
Political orientation. The worldview factor scores showed a systematic relation with political
orientation. Respondents were asked "Where would you place yourself on the following political
scale? Very liberal (1), liberal (2), middle of the road (3), conservative (4), or very conservative
(5)?" Persons scoring high on the Individualist factor tended toward conservatism (r = .17, p_ <
.0001). The correlation was r = .08 for the Fatalist/Hierarch factor scores (p < .01); persons high
on the Egalitarian factor tended toward liberalism (r = -.18, p < .0001). These results support
Dake's (1991) findings that Egalitarians tended to be liberal and Hierarchists and Individualists
were more conservative. However, his data indicated that Hierarchists were more highly
associated than Individualists with conservatism. Fatalists were not included in Dake's analysis.
Affect. The worldviews also varied in terms of the number of affect-laden images provided.
Persons with higher scores on the Fatalist/Hierarchical scale were likely to give fewer images. It
may be that these individuals have less concern about nuclear power issues because they either
trast the experts to make the right decisions or have given up their desire for control. Because
they tend to allow others to make these decisions, and becauseindividuals have only limited
processing capacity and abilities, it may be that persons high on this factor put less cognitive
capacitytowardthese issues, pay less attention to coding images about nuclearpower and,
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therefore, have a tendency to produce fewer images. Note that it is also possible that persons
scoring high on this factor provided fewer images due to a difference in education level from
persons scoring low on this factor. Specifically, as a person's score on this factor becomes
higher, they tended to be less educated (r = -.28, p < .0001). However, persons scoring high on
the Egalitarian factor also tended to be less educated than persons who score low (r = -.14, p <
.0001), but the Egalitarian factor did not correlate significantly with number of images, thus this
alternate hypothesis appears unlikely.
As the analysis of the number of images by worldview suggests, there is a relation between
affect and worldview. It is hypothesized (Jenkins-Smith, 1993) that worldviews cognitively filter
information that individuals receive about a place and ultimately influence the content of an
individual's imagery as well as its affective evaluation. Data supporting this view is presented in
Figure 1 for those persons who scored highly (i.e., the upper quartile) on each worldview factor.
The frequency of very positive and very negative responses was related to the person's
worldview. In other words, a person high on the Fatalist/Hierarch factor was more likely than a
person scoring high on the Egalitarian factor to give a positive affective rating while a person
scoring high on the Egalitarian factor was more likely to give a negative affective rating.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Affect. Worldview. and Nuclear Support
Cultural theory holds that actors do not respond directly to situations but respond to them
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through mediating orientations (Eysenck, p. 790, cited in Dake, 1991). A worldview then, is
assumed to act as a cognitive and/or emotional filter on information influencing how we perceive
and act toward risky situations. Our data supports this hypothesis. An individual high on the
Fatalist/Hierarchical measure is more likely to support nuclear power, whereas an individual high
on the Egalitarian measure is likely to oppose it.
If affect andworldviews both orient an individual's riskperception, a regression analysis^
should find that each significantly and independently predicts nuclear support. A series of
hierarchical, nonstepwise, regression analyses were performed that provided support for this
hypothesis.
The first model was of the form:
Average nuclear support = (Average affect rating across all images + Number of images)
The second model was of the form:
Average nuclear support = Fatalist/Hierarch + Individualist + Egalitarian factor scores
The third model was of the form:
Average nuclear support = (Average affect rating across all images + Number of images)
+ (Fatalist/Hierarch + Individualist + Egalitarian factor scores)
As stated previously, average nuclear support was an index based on averaging the responses
to the five items in Table 2. This index had a reliability of .84. The top row of Table 6 indicates
that the affect and worldview variables were individually correlated with the dependent variable
of nuclearsupport. The correlation between affect andnuclear support was particularly high (r =
.50).
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Insert Table 6 about here
Model 1. Average affect and number of images alone had a large effect size (R, = .50) when
predicting nuclear support with the overall model significanceat p < .0001.. The average affect
7 8parameter was. significant (p< .0001) as was thenumber of images (p< .02). ' ^
Model 2. Worldviews alone also had a large effect size when predicting nuclear support (R =
.38) with the overall model significance at p < .0001. All three worldviewparameterswere
significant at the .0001 level.
The robustness of the worldview parameters was tested by forcing age, sex, education,
income, and race into the model before allowing worldviews to enter. Again, all three
worldviews were significant predictors and their standardized coefficients were virtually
unchanged by inclusion of the various demographic factors in the model.
Model 3. While worldviews and average affect separately provided significant explanatory
power for the question posed about nuclear power, how well did they together predict the
answers to this samequestion? As shown previously, affectalonepredicted nuclear support quite
well (R, = .50), as did worldviews alone (R = .38). The third model, whichcombines affectand
worldview, did even better (R, - .55) with the overallmodel significance at p < .0001. Each
variable is statistically significant (p < .0001), after takinginto account all other independent
variables in the model, with the exception of the numberof images (p < .16).
To test ourhypothesis thataffect and worldviews each contributed independently to the
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prediction of nuclear support, tests of the change in R-squared (i.e., the change in proportion of
variance explained) were performed. The results supported our initial hypothesis and indicated
that affect provided significant explanatory power over and above worldviewsjust as worldviews
provide significant explanatory power over and above affect. The respective E's were
E(2,1339) = 150.0 and F(3,1339) = 36.8.
In the Model 3 regression analysis, the affectivemeasure has a higher standardized regression
coefficient(.41) than any of the worldview measures. However, due to unreliability of the
worldview factors, we cannot conclude that affect is a better predictor of nuclear support. This
i
issue should be re-examined once the worldview factors have been developed further to improve
their reliability.
Predicting support for nuclear power. Scores were computed for each individual from the full
regression model in which both affect and worldviews were predictors. These predicted scores
were then divided into four equalgroups. Thosewho scored lowestwere expected to show little
support for nuclear powerwhilethosewho scored highest wereexpected to be most likelyto
support nuclear power. A comparison of thesepredicted scores (seeFigure 2) with each
individual's response to a singleitem from the nuclear support index(i.e., "Ifyour community
was faced with a potential shortage of electricity, do you.. .agree...that a new nuclear power
plant should bebuilt to supply that electricity?") reveals the strength ofa prediction based on
affect and worldviews. Among thosewho scored lowest in the regression model, only 15%
agreed. Among those who scored highest inthe model's predictions* 76% said they would agree
to support nuclear power.
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Insert Figure 2 about here
Discussion
While individuals do examine the facts presented to them with regard to nuclear issues, their
attitudes toward nuclear power appear to be oriented by means of both affect and cognition.
Worldviews, as well as affect linked to images associated with nuclear power, appear to
influence support for nuclear energy. As affect became more negative and as belief in an
Egalitarian worldview increased, support for nuclear power decreased. As affect became more
positive and belief in a Fatalist/Hierarch or Individualist worldview increased, support for
nuclear power increased. These results support the previous worldview findings by Dake and
Jenkins-Smith. The Jenkins-Smith proposal that worldview and affect are related is supported as
well. A person who scored high on the Egalitarian factor was more likely to have negative affect
toward nuclear power images while a person scoring high on the Fatalist/Hierarchical factor was
more likely to have positive affect!
Worldviews are measures of a person's attitudes toward political, economic, and social
relations. What is important to one type of person (e.g., individuality to an Individualist) may not
be important to another (e.g., individuality to a Fatalist/Hierarch). On the other hand, people
holding different worldviews may find the same goal important, but have different views on
whether its current state needs to be monitored or regulated or what its priority is in relation to
other important goals. For example, Individualists may believe that the free market mechanism
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will ensure proper use of our environmental resources, while Egalitarians may believethat nature
is fragile and must be protected by strict regulations.
Understanding these patterns of beliefs is critical to assessing the technical impact of a new
technology and its myriad of social impacts. What is important, why it is important, and what
should be done are all questions that will be answereddifferently by persons holding different
worldviews. A better understanding of who is impacted by a newtechnology andtheir __
worldviews may improve our chances of comingto a solution that works for most people.
Worldviews interact with perceptions of health risks, attitudes toward technology and the
environment, personality characteristics, and various demographic variables. While the present
data cannot answer the questionof which camefirst, the chickenor the egg, we propose that
worldviews beginto develop earlythrough general life experiences. Our attitudes towardrisk, as
suggested by earlier research (Dake, 1991, 1992; Jenkins-Smith, 1993) develop within and
seemed to be oriented by the social and cultural milieuwithin whichwe live. It may be that
worldviews provide a kindof starting point or anchor for a risk attitude that is adjusted as a
personexperiences information or events specific to a particular technology.
Affect, on the otherhand, can be viewedas constructed or interpreted through cognitive
mediation (e.g., Lazarus, 1974), or reactive in a Darwinian sense and influential onthecognitive
process itself(e.g., Zajonc, 1980). Notwithstanding the controversy over which comes first,
cognition oremotion, it is clear that affective processes are fundamental to our thinking about
nuclear power. If "virtually all cognitions have some affective qualities" (Murphy &Zajonc,
1993, p. 724), nuclear issues, inparticular, seem topossess strong affective qualities. The data
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from the present study suggest that affect alone can be used as a powerful predictor of support for
nuclear power.
Affect toward images associated with nuclear power likely develops as a result of exposure to
specific information about radiation and nuclear technologies. However, the present data suggest
that is riot a complete story. Affect associated with images of nuclear power was systematically
related to a person's worldviews. How we feel about a riskseems to be determined in partby_
how management of that risk is set within the power structures of industry and government and
how that type ofmanagement pattern relates to the individual's view of how the world should be
organized.
The Jenkins-Smith model is able to account for some of the present findings including
worldviews' influence on affect. While it is possible that the reverse causal relation is true (i.e.,
affect toward nuclear energy influences worldview), this seems unlikely because it would create
a situation whereby an individual's worldview is constantly bombarded by affect toward various
situations in life. Maintaining beliefs over time would be difficult if this were the case. It is not at
all clear, however, whether the Jenkins-Smith model can account for the significant, independent,
predictive power of affect above and beyond worldviews, because it assumesa cognitive
mediation of affect through image content and worldviews (i.e., the argument that cognition
precedes affect, for example, Lazarus, 1974).
In conclusion, affective reactions and worldviews appear to play similar roles as orienting
mechanisms, helping peoplenavigate in a complex, uncertain, and sometimes dangerous world.
To the extentthat our judgmentsand actions are influenced by such"nontechnical" factors as
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affect and worldviews, we can appreciate why communication of technical information about
risk often has little effect on public attitudes toward hazards such as nuclear power plants or
, nuclear waste repositories. Our attitudes toward nuclear power are part of "who we are." We
cannot easily change these attitudes without changing some parts of our social worldviews and
our emotional makeup.
We suspect that the judgments and decisions of technical experts, too, are "oriented" to a
certain degree by their worldviews and their affective reactions. For example, Slovic et al. (in
press) observed that toxicologists' evaluations of chemical risks were associated with their
worldviews. Further research with both experts and laypeople should help clarify this issue.
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Footnotes
Dread is highly correlated with perceptions ofrisk and the desire for risk reduction. Though it is
a potentially important component of affective evaluations of technology, research on this aspect
of dread has not been pursued (for one exception—see Gregory & Mendelsohn, 1993).
A breakdown of the individual ratings showed, roughly similar distributions. The ratings are
shown here as their distributions across very positive/positive, neutral, and negative/very
negative, respectively: the 1460 first image ratings (47.8%, 12.0%, 40.3%), the 1216 second
image ratings (48.6%, 11.5%, 39.9%), and the 861 third image ratings (42.9%, 13.4%, 43.8%).
. 3Factor scores were computed for each respondent by factor. For each factor, an individual's
scores on each of the variables are multiplied by the factor score coefficients for those variables,
and the products are summed across the variables to yield a factor score.
4These alpha coefficients are not necessarily low, given that only four to seven attitude items
load on any one factor: Future studies can increase reliability through the addition of more items
relevant to each of these worldview attitudes. The Spearman-Brown formula indicates that
increasing the numberof items that distinguish the Egalitarians from 4 to 12, for example, would
increase reliability from .50 to .75.
5All of these correlations (Tables 2-6) are attenuated due to unreliability ofthefactors and the
attitude item questions. Corrected correlations would increase between 29% (if the other attitude
items here are perfectly reliable) and 116% (if the other attitude items have a reliability of .50).
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For example, correction of an attenuated correlation ofi = .30 would raise the value to between
r=.39 and i =.65.
Individual respondents may be included in all, some, or none of these upper quartiles. Of the
1512 total respondents, 49.5%) scored in the upper quartile of none of these factors, 2.6% scored
in the upper quartile of all three factors, 12.9% scored highly on two factors, 13.4% scored
highly on the Fatalist/Hierarch factor only, 11.0% on the Individualist factor only, and 10.6% on
the Egalitarian factor only.
7Because the image that comes to mind first may be the most powerful, it ispossible that using
the mean affect score dilutes these results. However, a separate regression model using only the
first image rating predicted the nuclear support index somewhat less well (R = .47).
o
It is possible that, because no more than three images were elicited from any respondent, these
results may have been biased for those respondents who wanted to provide more than three
images. In a more recent unpublished study with college students, however, we collectedup to
six images. A comparison of the same regressionmodel in the present study using three images
suggests there was little biasing. Multiple correlations using three and six images were R = .41
and R = .45, respectively.
9The reliability ofthe affect measure is .72 as calculated by the alpha coefficient.
10 Figure 2, based on both affect and worldviews, shows a strong predictive relationship. Using
affectalone as a predictor, the relationship would be only slightly less strong (Quartile 1 would
predict 13%agreement and Quartile 4 would predict 69%) agreement). If the threeworldviews
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were combined to predict support, without affect as a predictor, the relationship would still be
strong (25.7%agreementfor Quartile 1 and 64.5% agreement for Quartile 4).
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' Table 1. Rotated Factor Structure
•
•
•
• Fatalist/
Item hierarch Individualist Egalitarian
122. It's no use worrying about public affairs; I can't do
anything about them anyway .68 .
55. When there is a reallyserious health problem, then
;; public health officials will take care of it. Until they
j. alert meabout a specific problem, I don't really have to
i worry .63
64. Decisions about health risks should be left to the
•
experts •= .57 — -
123. We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this
t
j. country .52 -.32
•
; 120. When the risk is very small, it is OK for society to
impose that risk on individuals without their consent .48 ; -.36
63. I have very little control over risks to my health .43 .36
125. The police should have the right to listen to private
phone calls to investigate a crime .41
109. I am in favor of capital punishment •67
111. In a fair system people with more ability should earn
more .59
i 124. Continued economicgrowth is necessary to improve
!! our quality of life .44 .
112. Government has no right to regulate people's personal
risk-taking activities such as smoking, mountain
,' climbing, hand gliding, etc. .43
121. What this world needs is a more equal distribution of
wealth .68
113. If people in this country were treated equally, we
would have fewer problems .64
110. People in positions of authority tend to abuse their
power .44 .50
126. Thosein power oftenwithhold information about
things that are harmful to us . .39
Proportion of variance explained 15.9% 9.5% 11.7%
Coefficient alpha .60 . .42 .50
Note, Loadings below .30 aredeleted from thetable. Sample size for this analysis was 1386.
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Table 2. Correlations Between Worldview Factor Scores and Items Pertaining to Nuclear Support
Item
5. If your community was faced with a potential shortage
of electricity, do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or
strongly disagree that a new nuclear power plant should
be built to supply that electricity?
104. Please indicate how acceptable (nuclear power) is to
you for meeting the nation's future energy needs
68. In order to avoid importing energy from other countries
to meet our future electricity needs, America should
rely more heavily on nuclear power
77. The nuclear power industry says that it is now possible
to build a new generation of nuclear power plants that
will be safer than existing plants. Assuming the nuclear
power industry is correct, I would support such a new
generation of nuclear plants to supply the country's
future electricity needs.
65. In light of health concerns about acid rain, damage to
the ozone layer, and climate change associated with the
burning of coal and oil, America should rely more
heavily on nuclear power to meet its future electricity
needs
Nuclear support index (average of 5 items)
Reliability = .83
*p.<.0001
M=1332
Fatalist/
hierarch
.16*
.13"
.18*
.13*
.19*
.20*
Individualist
.15*
.16*
.13*
.16*
.09
.17*
Egalitarian
-.24*
-.24*
-2\*
-.20*
-.17*
-.28*
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Table 3 Correlations Between Worldview Factor Scores and Items Pertaining to Technoloev and the Environment
Item
Fatalist/
hierarch Individualist Egalitarian
Technology
119. Our government and industry can be trusted with .
making the proper decisions to manage the risks from
technology .33** .05 -.22**
118. Our technologies might impose risks on future
generations, but I believe future generations will be
able to take care of themselves .24** .14** -.10*
114. We need to pull together and support the energy
choices our government has made .18** .18** -.01
108. A high technology society is important for improving
our health and well being -.05 .32** .02
Environmental concerns
117. Technological development is destroying nature .00 -.05 .31**
59. The greenhouse effect is a serious problem which could
lead to harmful changes in the environment and in
people's health -.18** -.02 .26**
47. The land, air, and water around us are, in general, more
contaminated now than ever before -.12** -.03 .20**
115. Continued economic growth can only lead to pollution
and depletion of natural resources .21** -.02 .16*
*p.<.001
**rj<.0001
H=1342
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Table 4. Correlations Between Worldview Factor Scores and Items Pertaining to Perceived Health Risks
Item
Fatalist/
hierarch Individualist Egalitarian
7. Nuclear power plants -.03 -.13** .27**
11. Nuclear waste -.10* -.08 .24**
30. Food irradiation (to preserve food) .06 -.04 .22**
20. Chemical pollution in the environment -.08 -07 .20**
25. Use ofgenetically engineered bacteria in agriculture .05 -.08 .19**
27. Depletion of the ozone layer = -.06 -.12** .18*1 ,
21. Pesticides in food -.02 -.10* .18**
29. Climate change (global warming/greenhouse effect) -.03 -.08 .18**
18. Radon in the home .02 -.03 .16**
1 32. Stress -.11** -.01 .14**
J
17. Coal/oil burning power plants -.05 -.10* .13**
19. Medical X-rays .09* -.08 .12**
', 28. Outdoor air quality • -.05 -.03 .12**
15. Street drugs (heroin, cocaine, etc.) .05 .01 .12**
•I 9. High voltagepower lines -.02 -.12** .11**
•• 23. Bacteria in food 04. -.06 .11**
33. Videodisplayterminals .06 -.06 .11**
13. AIDS -.06 .00 .11**
'' 35. Commercial air travel .13** —.06 .10**
34. Storms and floods .09* -.06 .08
36. Blood transfusions . .14** .04 .08
22. Cigarettesmoking -.08 -.02 .06
26. Motor vehicle accidents . .04 .00 .06
31. Suntanning -07 -.08 .06
J
24. Drinking alcoholic beverages -.02 ^.02 .04
Note, These items asked people to rate the risk to the U.S. public as awhole as little orno risk, slight risk, moderate
risk, orhigh risk. These responses were coded 1- 4 respectively, for purposes ofthecorrelational analysis. N_ =
1179.
*p.<.001
**C<.0001
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Table 5. Correlations Between Worldview Factor Scores and Items Pertaining to Desire for Public Control
Fatalist/
Item hierarch Individualist Egalitarian
87. People living near a nuclear power plant should have
the authority to close the plant if they think it is not
being run properly -.01 -.03 .30**
83. Nuclear power plants should not be built and operated
unless the people in surrounding areas voluntarily
agree to accept them -.05 .08 .27
75. The public should vote to decide on issues such as
nuclearpower -.10* .06 .24
#*
**
89. The process of licensing nuclearpowerplantsprovides
adequate opportunity for the public to have their
concerns considered
*p.<.001
**j><.0001
H=1335
.16** .11** -.17*
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Table 6. Correlations Between Affect Variables. Worldviews. and Support for Nuclear Power
Nuclear support index
Average affect
Number of images
Fatalist/Hierarch
Individualist
Egalitarian
Nuclear support Average Number of Fatalist/
index affect images hierarch Individualist Egalitarian
1.00 .50** -.09* .20** .17** -.28**
1.00 -.06 .17** .16** -.21**
1.00 -.15** -.02 .06
1.00 .00
1.00
.00
.00
1700'
Note. H £ 1295 for all correlations. Any r £ -06 is significant at p.< .05.
*p<.001
**p<.0001
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Distribution of the average affect rating for nuclear power by the upper quartile of
each worldview. The affect measure was averaged over the images produced to the stimulus,
"nuclear power," by each individual, and then was translated back to the original scale of very
negative to very positive. On a scale from 1-5, in this graph, negative = 1 to 2.5, neutral (not
shown) = 2.67 to 3.33, and positive = 3.5 to 5.0. The worldview measure is based on those
individuals who scored in the upper quartile of each worldview factor (i.e., presumably hold the
strongest beliefs about that chosen way of looking at the world).
Figure 2. Relationship between predictions ofnuclear support based on affect and worldviews
and actual nuclear support. Actual nuclear support was based on the percent agreeing that, if their
community was faced with a potential shortage of electricity, a new nuclear power plant should
be built to supply that electricity.
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